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162 BOOK REVIEWS 
Sophocles' Oedipus: Evidence and Self-Conviction. By FREDERICK AHL. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 1991. Pp. xii + 297. $41.50 (cloth), $12.95 
(paper). 
The argument of this book is that Sophocles' Oedipus Tyrannus is not about 
Oedipus' discovery that he has killed his father and married his mother, but rather 
about Oedipus' unwarranted leap to the conclusion that he has done these things in 
the face of evidence that is inconclusive and insufficiently examined. While most 
classicists wiH want to dismiss this unorthodox thesis as eccentric and absurd, it 
does deserve to be taken seriously. There is some striking textual evidence to sup­
port Ahl's interpretation, and he is not the only critic to advance it. We owe A. a 
willingness to try to think ourselves out of our inherited vision of this classic work; 
in turn, we can expect from him answers to two questions: What do we stand to 
gain by relinquishing our familiar understanding of the Oedipus Tyrannus as a play 
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about the inescapability of fate? And why has almost no one understood the play 
correctly-by A.'s lights-in the last twenty-five hundred years? 
A.'s book has an important precursor in an article by Sandor Goodhart that ap-
peared in Diacritics in 1978: "Al]cr'ta~ ~EqiamCE: Oedipus and Laius' Many Mur-
derers." Goodhart concentrates on the most conspicuous flaw in the evidence on 
which Oedipus convicts himself of the murder of Laius: the discrepancy between 
the claim of the one surviving witness that Laius was killed by a group of men and 
the recollection of Oedipus that he was the sole killer of the old man he met on the 
way from Delphi to Thebes. Sophocles underscores this discrepancy when he has 
Oedipus, as he waits for that witness to appear, stress to Jocasta his hope that the 
witness will confirm that the murderers of Laius were many and so will exonerate 
Oedipus (OT 842-47). Yet Oedipus fails to pursue this question when the witness 
arrives. This is because the intervening visit of the Corinthian messenger has 
shifted Oedipus' focus to the more pressing question of his own identity; the wit-
ness to the murder has become more interesting in his other role as the shepherd 
who gave the infant raised by Polybus and Merope to the Corinthian. 
A. surveys the entire play and finds that, in every episode, Oedipus similarly 
accepts inadequate evidence against himself without examining it carefully. This 
epistemological disaster is fostered both by Oedipus' own personality and by the 
personalities of his informants. Oedipus is obsessed with himself and with his 
fears about the crimes prophesied for him, while his informants, consistently mo-
tivated by self-interest, play on Oedipus' fears to further their own ends. For 
example, Oedipus unquestioningly accepts the idea that the plague in Thebes is 
linked to Laius' death even though that is an interpretation advanced by Creon of 
an oracle for which Creon is the only source. Despite the suspicions of Creon that 
he later voices, Oedipus fails to notice that Creon is manipulating him as part of a 
subtle-and successful-plot to become ruler of Thebes. 
Similarly, according to A., Oedipus allows Teiresias to stimulate his doubts 
about his own paternity without presenting any evidence, forgetting that Teiresias 
may resent him because of his success with the Sphinx. On the basis of what he is 
told by the Corinthian, Oedipus comes to the consequential conclusion that he is 
not the son of Polybus but a foundling. Yet the Corinthian contradicts himself, say-
ing at one point that he came upon the infant Oedipus on Mt. Cithaeron ( OT 1026), 
but a few lines later that he received him from someone else (OT 1038-40). He 
also contradicts the drinking companion who first raised Oedipus' doubts about 
this paternity: that man implied Oedipus had been presented to Polybus by Merope 
(OT782), the Corinthian says that he himself gave him to Polybus (OT 1022). And 
the Corinthian is an unreliable informant because he is openly motivated by the 
hope of a reward when Oedipus takes over Polybus' throne ( OT 1005-6) and there-
fore can be expected to say whatever will lead Oedipus to think it would be safe to 
return to Corinth. 
Oedipus' decision that he is the murderer of Laius and the son of Laius and Jo-
casta comes in his encounter with the old Theban servant who is both the eyewit-
ness to the murder and the servant to whom Jocasta-as the servant claims ( OT 
1173), but she implies it was Laius (OT717-19)-gave the infant to be exposed. 
Yet if that servant really did witness the murder, his very existence contradicts 
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Oedipus' memory that he killed all of the men in the group he encountered; if he 
did not, his trustworthiness is questionable. 
In developing this interpretation, A. makes arguments most of us have been 
trained to view as illegitimate because they observe no distinction between litera-
ture and life. He rejects the principle enunciated in particular by Roland Barthes 
that the characters in literature must not be treated as if they were real people. He 
freely attributes to Sophocles' characters experiences that transcend the words of 
Sophocles' text, asserting, for example, that when Creon says he has no interest in 
political power he is really thinking the opposite, or that when Creon arouses Oedi-
pus to anger he is deliberately provoking a type of behavior he has witnessed many 
times in the past. 
A. often finds psychological significance in what most critics would class as lit-
erary devices. When Oedipus tells the Corinthian messenger about the circum-
stances of his own departure from Corinth, A. does not see this as an expedient by 
which Sophocles conveys this information to his audience, but comments that "it is 
curious that Oedipus so readily accepts the anonymous stranger as confessor here" 
(p. 170). When Jocasta suggests that Oedipus enter the house, this is not a sign that 
Sophocles wants to clear the stage for the chorus, but evidence that she feels the 
need for a private conversation. When the Corinthian answers Oedipus' question 
about how Polybus died by saying, "a small stroke lays old bodies to rest" (OT 
961), the generality of his statement is a sign of suspicious equivocation on the 
speaker's part rather than a feature of Sophoclean style. In general, Sophocles as 
the poet who shapes an artificial representation of experience tends to disappear 
from A.'s account to be replaced by wholly autonomous characters. 
It is much easier to register unease with these arguments than it is to refute them 
conclusively. Any coherent understanding of a literary character requires some 
embroidery on hints given by the text, and it is hard to lay down rules for when to 
draw the line. Most readers of the play would claim that when Creon says he has 
never craved power, he should be believed, but that when Oedipus says that he has 
been suspecting Creon of treachery, he probably should not be believed: he says 
this in a defensive response to Teiresias' declarations and we certainly should not 
think he had suspicions that would, as A. would have it, make it notably odd that 
he sent Creon to Delphi in the first place. And yet it is hard to offer an iron-clad 
justification for this variable skepticism, which largely stems from the assumption 
that Creon exists in the play only to further the presentation of Oedipus and there-
fore is not depicted in the same psychological depth. 
Furthermore, embracing logical inconsistencies as a by-product of literariness 
means finding sloppiness in a play that is regularly praised as a masterwork of 
accomplished plot construction and renouncing the critical principle that works of 
literature repay close reading with minute attention to detail. It is not an accident 
that A.'s closest allies in a way turn out to be scholarly commentators with an eye 
for textual problems, such as R. C. Jebb and especially R. D. Dawe, who often 
have noted the same discrepancies, although without drawing the same conclu-
sions. For example, both A. and Dawe note that the text gives confusing informa-
tion about whether the witness to Laius' death first returned to Thebes immediately 
after the killing or only after Oedipus had arrived and established himself there. 
Dawe can only censure this as a flaw in Sophocles' workmanship: "More serious 
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perhaps than the offence against real life logic is the offence against dramatic like-
lihood" (R. D. Dawe, ed., "Oedipus Rex" [Cambridge, 1982], p. 16); for A., the 
confusion is a creative way of evoking doubt about the evidence against Oedipus. 
Because the Oedipus Tyrannus is concerned with the detection of crimes, it fore-
grounds the parallel, which so engaged Aristotle, between the lawyer's task of per-
suading jurors in a courtroom that something has happened and the poet's task of 
persuading viewers in a theater that something has happened. A. forces us to con-
sider why we are willing to accept flimsier evidence in viewing a play than we 
would in judging a trial. 
While A.'s method of reading provides a bracing challenge to our familiar criti-
cal habits, he is less successful than Goodhart in answering the two questions raised 
above about what larger purpose this radical rereading might serve and why it has 
never surfaced before. Drawing on a variety of contemporary theories, most prom-
inently those of Jacques Derrida and Rene Girard, Goodhart sees both Oedipus and 
Sophocles' audience as caught up in the "idolatry of the Oedipal perspective," an ir-
rational willingness to understand human actions as shaped by the inevitability of 
parricide and incest. We all evince a tendency to self-incrimination that leads us to 
grant authority to pronouncements that these crimes are inevitable: thus Oedipus 
comes to believe the Delphic oracle, and Sophocles' readers acquiesce in his con-
clusions because they are motivated by the same impulses. For modern readers this 
inclination is reinforced by Freudian psychoanalysis, which recapitulates the ora-
cle's pronouncement, now making parricide and incest desires to be found in every 
psyche rather than the destined actions of a particular individual. 
Not only does Goodhart succeed in explaining why Sophocles' audiences have 
routinely ignored the play's hints that Oedipus is not necessarily guilty, but his po-
sition is humane: learning to see our acceptance of the traditional Oedipus myth as 
idolatry promises to liberate us from a constraining vision of human nature as ines-
capably criminal. Furthermore, Goodhart, following Girard, identifies the social as 
well as the psychological forces that help to promote this idolatry: Oedipus' self-
incrimination is one example of the scapegoating mechanism through which socie-
ties control violence by channelling it against a single victim who is imagined to 
be more criminal than everyone else. The Girardian dimension of Goodhart's argu-
ment is especially appealing because it provides a framework within which the 
particular discrepancy in the evidence from which Goodhart starts is itself signifi-
cant: Oedipus' decision that Laius had a single murderer rather than many neatly 
illustrates the process of scapegoating. 
A. is less clear about what the point of adopting this view of the play would be. 
He seems to think much of the time that Sophocles is portraying Oedipus as a so-
ciopath surrounded by mean-spirited self-seekers with no interest in helping him ar-
rive at the truth. He reads Oedipus through the lens of Plato's descriptions in the 
Republic of dangerously irrational souls, branding him as "egocentric and paranoid; 
the very embodiment of Plato's tyrannical soul ... " (p. 262). According to A., Oed-
ipus' egotism can be seen in the way he turns his attention from the problems of 
Thebes to the question of his own identity; in his inability to recognize that others 
may have motives that serve their own interests rather than his; and in his inclination 
to make himself a scapegoat, which stems from a desire for self-aggrandizement. 
Rather than being admired for his willingness to be punished, he is to be faulted for 
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abandoning Thebes to the disastrous consequences that follow on his departure. Few 
readers will feel that this repellent characterization answers to their own experience 
of the play or that it offers much compensation for the suspension of their usual criti-
cal standards. 
A. at one point attributes the pervasiveness of the more orthodox interpretation 
to the undue influence of Seneca's Oedipus, but he also claims that we, by believ-
ing that Oedipus is correct, are making the same mistake he is and that "perhaps 
this is precisely the trap into which Sophocles would have us fall" (p. x). But he 
never develops the implications of our identification with Oedipus in view of his 
image of Oedipus as representing the extreme negative behavior associated with 
tyrants. In fact, by portraying Oedipus so negatively for making interpretative 
errors that most readers of the play replicate, A. seems to be engaging in some 
unacknowledged scapegoating of his own. 
The question of how we are to understand Sophocles' intentions is key to any 
attempt to assess this approach. Both Goodhart and A. write as if their interpreta-
tion describes Sophocles' conscious aims, but it is hard to believe that Sophocles 
himself really meant to present Oedipus in the OT as deluded, despite A.'s re-
minders that there was wide variation in the presentation of traditional myths in 
tragedy and that Sophocles lived in a climate of considerable skepticism towards 
the Delphic oracle. In adducing evidence for Sophocles' intentions, A. never deals 
with the Oedipus Coloneus, which, despite its lateness, clearly looks back to the 
Oedipus Tyrannus. There Sophocles develops a position on Oedipus' past crimes 
that involves both insisting that they happened and relieving Oedipus of the bur-
den of responsibility for them. This, like Freud's vision of the psychoanalytic 
cure, is a humane response to Oedipus' situation from within the Oedipal perspec-
tive, and it does not square well with an earlier depiction of Oedipus as guilty 
only in his own imagination. In any case, the Oedipus Coloneus surely has played 
at least as much of a role as Seneca's Oedipus in fostering the canonical interpre-
tation of the Oedipus Tyrannus. 
The approach of A. and Goodhart would be more fruitful if it were detached 
from the claim to identify Sophocles' intentions. There is no reason why we cannot 
include Sophocles among those who have been under the sway of the Oedipal per-
spective, seeing him, like the Oedipus he created and like Freud who appropriated 
that Oedipus as a model for the human psyche, as determined to affirm an Oedipal 
vision. The critic's task would then be to locate the forces that caused Sophocles to 
leave so many conspicuous loose ends in making his case, whether in the slipperi-
ness of language, as a deconstructionist might, or in the author's unconscious, as a 
Freudian might. 
This approach to the Oedipus Tyrannus works best as an instance of the instructive 
practice of reading texts with a critical rather than an automatically sympathetic at-
titude towards the author's intentions. If we are going to insist on Sophocles' role in 
actively shaping the play we have, we should also consider that he did not have to 
shape it exactly as he did. One of the most eye-opening effects of A.'s book is that it 
shows us how different the action of the play looks if we focus on the viewpoints of 
characters other than Oedipus. This allows us to see not what these characters actu-
ally experienced, since they really do not exist outside the play, but what vistas 
Sophocles has attempted to foreclose by directing our attention to one central 
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character. A. is also excellent at revealing how much the realization of the author's 
intentions depends on the complicity of his readers. Some of the best moments in the 
book are those in which he shows how modern translators have misrepresented the 
literal Greek text in order to help Sophocles convey more clearly what they are sure 
he meant. Adding this approach to our arsenal of perspectives on the play would not 
prevent us from attempting to elicit Sophocles' intentions and admiring the skill with 
which he has fulfilled them, but it could help us to ask whether we have to surrender 
ourselves to his vision. Through recognizing that the play gives us not only an op­
portunity to identify with Oedipus' self-conviction, but also an opportunity to see 
that Oedipus' conclusions are not inescapable, we may be better able to resist a lim­
iting and defeatist view of human possibility. 
Sheila Murnaghan 
University of Pennsylvania 
